A Conservative Approach to America

Five takeaways from Pierre Poilievre’s belated and mostly successful tour of the United States

Canadian Conservative Party leader Pierre Poilievre toured the United States from March 13 to March 19, with stops in Detroit, Houston, Austin, and New York City. In a pre-trip video message, he framed the trip as an effort to “leverage the relationship we have with the American people,” arguing that while Canada cannot control decisions made in Washington, it can draw on goodwill and shared interests across the border.

Over a series of stops, Poilievre’s trip dispelled the notion that he was indifferent to the United States or uncomfortable engaging Americans on U.S.–Canada relations. Unlike Maurice Sendak’s Pierre, Poilievre cares about bilateral relations—and about the damage done by U.S. taunts and tariffs since January 2025.

Poilievre and the Conservatives maintained a healthy lead over Justin Trudeau’s Liberals through most of 2024 and early 2025, but the April 28, 2025, federal election produced a new Liberal minority government. Critics attributed Poilievre’s loss in part to a perceived lack of credibility on U.S.–Canada relations, particularly uncertainty about how he would deal with U.S. President Donald Trump.

For many observers in both countries, that question has lingered since Mark Carney succeeded Trudeau as Liberal leader and became prime minister. What, then, did Poilievre’s March 2026 U.S. tour reveal about his approach to the bilateral relationship? Five takeaways stand out.

1. Long Time, No See

There have been five Conservative Party leaders since Donald Trump’s election in 2016: Rona Ambrose (November 2015–May 2017), Andrew Scheer (May 2017–August 2020), Erin O’Toole (August 2020–February 2022), Candice Bergen (February 2022–September 2022), and Poilievre, who won the leadership in September 2022. The British Conservatives have had six leaders over the same period, but all but one served as prime minister; none of the Canadian leaders did. Poilievre stands out as the only one of these eleven not to visit Washington as leader.

That absence matters. Poilievre’s reluctance may reflect Trudeau’s efforts to tie him politically to Trump, who was unpopular across Canada even before his second term. Whatever the cause, Poilievre has remained both little known and easily caricatured in Washington. In December 2024, Vice President J.D. Vance dismissed him as “Mitt Romney with a French accent”—a line that is inaccurate on its own terms and analytically thin. More pointedly, Donald Trump said in a March 17 interview on Fox News’ The Ingraham Angle, (as reported by Mickey Djuric for Politico):

“The Conservative that’s running is, stupidly, no friend of mine,” Trump said on “The Ingraham Angle” in a March 17 interview. “I don’t know him, but he said negative things — so when he says negative things, I couldn’t care less. I think it’s easier to deal actually with a Liberal.”

Whether Poilievre lost the 2025 election because he avoided Washington—or lost Washington because he lost the election—the result is the same: this outreach comes late. It may be too late to convince either Canadian voters or the Trump administration that he is ready to govern.

2. Engaging America Beyond Washington

Poilievre framed his trip as an effort to engage the American people directly and tap into longstanding goodwill toward Canada. As I have argued elsewhere, the foundation of U.S.–Canada relations is a durable friendship between the two societies. By that standard, the strategy makes sense—and, on its own terms, the trip largely succeeded.

The itinerary was bookended by business-focused engagements. In Detroit, Poilievre proposed negotiating a new Auto Pact, invoking the 1965 sectoral agreement widely seen in Canada—especially in Ontario—as a high point in bilateral relations. In the United States, however, the Auto Pact is remembered more ambivalently, particularly for the investment and production commitments extracted from U.S. automakers that nearly prompted the Nixon administration to withdraw.

In Houston, Poilievre met with energy executives to discuss oil and gas trade; by most accounts, the reception from the Texas business community was positive. The tour concluded in New York, where he addressed the Foreign Policy Association and appeared on Bloomberg. Both appearances were polished and effective.

The most revealing stop, however, was in Austin, where Poilievre appeared on The Joe Rogan Experience. Over more than two hours, he presented himself not only as a political figure but as a person: a fan of mixed martial arts, a student of Milton Friedman and Viktor Frankl, and an adopted child whose early life shaped his political outlook. He comes across as a familiar type—an intellectually driven conservative with a slightly nerdy intensity that is ultimately disarming. He moves fluidly between personal narrative and policy arguments, projecting both sincerity and confidence.

If Trump or Vance were to watch the episode, they might reconsider their earlier dismissals. More importantly, many Americans encountering Poilievre for the first time would find him more relatable—and more serious—than his caricature suggests.

3. A Moderate Conservative Message

Beyond optics, the trip conveyed a consistent and substantive policy message. Poilievre rejected Prime Minister Mark Carney’s suggestion that U.S.–Canada relations have fundamentally ruptured and distanced himself from Carney’s “middle power” framing at Davos. While firmly rejecting Trump’s suggestion that Canada could become the 51st state, Poilievre avoided personalizing the issue and declined to blame Trump directly for his electoral loss.

Instead, he emphasized renewal through familiarity: Canada should be a stronger ally (via increased defense spending), a more effective trading partner (expanding energy, agriculture, and critical minerals exports), and a more reliable neighbor (enhancing border security and cooperation on immigration and opioids).

This is not a radical departure from existing policy. Rather, Poilievre offers a recognizably conservative but ultimately moderate approach—one that contrasts with Carney’s framing without fundamentally breaking from it. It is a subtle repositioning, but a coherent one.

4. The Myth of Leverage—and Its Risks

Yet the intellectual foundation of Poilievre’s trip—his emphasis on “leverage” derived from American goodwill—raises concerns.

Such arguments have a long pedigree in Canadian policy discourse. From Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney’s threat to cut off potash exports during the Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement negotiations to more recent claims about defense or energy leverage, Canadian policymakers have periodically argued that their contributions give them decisive bargaining power in Washington.

This view is misguided. At best, it overstates Canada’s influence; at worst, it creates expectations that are likely to be disappointed. More fundamentally, it rests on a faulty premise: that U.S.–Canada disputes persist because Americans do not understand Canada. In practice, most disagreements reflect genuine policy differences, not ignorance. Assuming otherwise risks underestimating the U.S. position—and misreading the nature of bilateral friction. This is the hazard that comes from overweighting the value of Americans’ goodwill toward Canadians and underestimating Washington’s capacity in the conduct of bilateral relations.

If leverage is an uncertain foundation for Canadian strategy, the question becomes where influence is actually built—and exercised.

5. Why Washington Still Matters

When I first came to Washington as a graduate student in 1991, I believed—as many Americans do—that the “real” country lay beyond the Beltway. That intuition still holds. But decades in Washington have also made clear that this city plays a central role in shaping both American policy and U.S.–Canada relations.

Poilievre chose not to include Washington in his tour. He justified this as a matter of principle: Canada has one prime minister at a time, and he would support Carney’s efforts in dealing with the United States. The position echoes Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s dictum that “politics stops at the water’s edge.”

It is an admirable stance—but, in today’s United States, an incomplete one.

American politics is too polarized for such norms to hold consistently. Relationships with Congress, think tanks, and policy networks are not optional; they are part of the operating environment of U.S. foreign policy. Private meetings, informal consultations, and off-the-record discussions provide essential insight into how Washington works—and how decisions are actually made.

For a leader of the opposition—and a self-described “prime minister in waiting”—avoiding Washington is therefore a strategic mistake. Engaging the American public is valuable and necessary, but it is not sufficient. Trust among leaders is built through direct interaction, not mediated through podcasts or social media.

The illusion of Washington is that its openness makes it legible from afar. In reality, the visible churn of debate sits atop deeper institutional dynamics that require sustained engagement to understand. Canadians, in particular, can be prone to overestimating their familiarity with the United States through media exposure and personal ties. That familiarity is real—but incomplete.

Epilogue

Poilievre’s U.S. tour was, in a small-c sense, conservative: modest in ambition, careful in tone, and respectful in execution. As an introduction to American audiences, it succeeded in presenting him as knowledgeable, serious, and grounded in both Canadian and American history.

At its best—particularly in the Rogan interview—it revealed a more personal and engaging side of Poilievre, one that may resonate beyond his political base. Unlike Sendak’s Pierre, he clearly cares. The tour is a useful beginning. The next test is whether Poilievre builds on this tour by engaging Washington directly.