Aligned, not just Allied
The 2025 US National Security Strategy Undervalues Canada
On December 4, the United States issued a new National Security Strategy. These strategies are mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and have been issued generally once in each presidential term.
Most of these reports have name-checked Canada twice: first, as a NAFTA or USMCA economic partner; and again, as a NATO member. The Biden administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy added a third mention of Canada, praising Canada’s Initiative Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, a response to China’s arrest of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor.
The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy mentions Canada only once, on page 22:
America First diplomacy seeks to rebalance global trade relationships. We have made clear to our allies that America’s current account deficit is unsustainable. We must encourage Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia, Canada, Mexico, and other prominent nations in adopting trade policies that help rebalance China’s economy toward household consumption, because Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East cannot alone absorb China’s enormous excess capacity. The exporting nations of Europe and Asia can also look to middle-income countries as a limited but growing market for their exports.
Canada is cited along with other wealthy, industrialized countries as part of a strategy to address China’s economic impact on the global economy.
Looking beyond the name-check count, the new US National Security Strategy addresses Canada indirectly in the second half of the report, which addresses global regions. Each region has a label attached indicating the US position with regard to that region. These are interesting enough to list here:
A. Western Hemisphere: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine
B. Asia: Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation
C. Promoting European Greatness
D. The Middle East: Shift Burdens, Build Peace
E. Africa
The fifth President of the United States, James Monroe, instituted the policy now known as the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. It declared the Western Hemisphere to be the United States sphere of influence in which no new European colonies could be established and called for the independence of existing colonies in the region - including those in British North America.
What is the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine? The 2025 National Security Strategy defines it on page 15:
After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests.
This policy puts Moscow and Beijing on notice that Russian and Chinese involvement in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and other Latin American countries will trigger a response from Washington. Likewise, Iran’s collusion and support for OPEC member Venezuela is now riskier for Tehran.
Canada could benefit from the “Trump Corollary”. In recent years I have participated in tabletop strategic exercises based on a scenario in which Russia sends a scientific research team to an island in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, then reinforces the researchers with a military presence triggering a crisis and redirects US military assets away from places like Ukraine, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. It is a classic “gray zone” hybrid warfare scenario consistent with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tactics elsewhere and a serious risk because of the limited domain awareness and deployable military assets that the United States and Canada have for Arctic operations. Canadian strategic planners can expect that Canadian efforts to invest in Arctic surveillance and military capabilities will be welcomed by the Trump administration.
Similarly, and Chinese or Russian effort to operate in or near Greenland, which the Trump administration shifted to US Northern Command’s Area of Responsibility in June, making it part of the Western Hemisphere in US strategy.
Economic Security and Economic Force
For the Trump administration, US economic prosperity and industrial capacity are central to American national security. The first half of the strategy articulates the administration’s six strategic economic objectives: (1) Balanced trade; (2) Securing Access to Critical Supply Chains and Materials; (3) Reindustrialization; (4) Reviving the US Defense Industrial Base; (5) Energy Dominance; and (6) Preserving and Growing America’s Financial Sector Dominance. These objectives are defined in the report, and for anyone who took consolation from the belief that President Trump was impulsive and undisciplined, the articulation of these objectives here will dispense with that illusion.
At the same time, there is room for the United States and Canada to partner in pursuit of all six of these objectives. Bilateral trade is largely balanced when one removes energy from the figures. As Canada finds ways to ship energy to new markets, even this trade could become more balanced - and to the extent that the US is refining Canadian oil, liquifying and loading Canadian natural gas at US ports for overseas markets, and mining uranium for the nuclear energy revival in the United States fueled by the need to power artificial intelligence, Canada will contribute to US energy dominance.
Although there has been too little progress in developing Canadian critical minerals reserves, and neither country has made much progress on the processing of critical minerals - the area in which China has become dominant - the Trump administration is aware that Canada contains minerals and materials that the United States needs. As the mandated review of the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) gets underway, one of the most common suggestions from industry for improving the USMCA is the addition of a chapter on critical minerals and rare earths trade and related investment rules.
Reindustrialization and strengthening the US defense industrial base are both familiar Trump concerns and rightly so: current US capacity in both areas is inadequate and this is an acute vulnerability when China’s strength in both areas is growing. In both areas, the urgency for the United States to address these vulnerabilities makes Canada critical. Canada’s industrial capacity is closely linked to that of the United States via sophisticated supply chains, and the two countries integrated their defense industrial bases through the 1956 Defense Production Sharing Agreement.
It is here that Prime Minister Mark Carney’s reformulation of what President Trump has called “natural conflict” between Canada and the United States as “natural competition” provides a paradigm shift. The United States may yet attain the objectives for reindustrialization and defense industrial base revitalization if future administrations adhere to the objectives and strategy outlined in the 2025 National Security Strategy, but not fast enough to meet the current threats to US security. Canada’s attention to its own reindustrialization and defense production capabilities will enhance security and economic strength for both countries. When both are playing catch up, this is not a zero-sum scenario, but one in which growing capacity becomes mutually reinforcing.
Similarly, Canada’s role within the US financial sector adds to its leading global role, with Canadian-headquartered banks like BMO and TD and the Maple Eight pension funds invest significantly in the United States and many of Canada’s leading companies list on US stock markets.
A Strategy for Canada’s National Security
Based on this preliminary review of the new Trump National Security Strategy, Canada has greater potential to support American national security than the document recognizes. Why is Canada being underestimated by the authors? Some part of this is ignorance, and another part is, I suspect, a perception of the opportunity cost of working with Canada.
Administration figures have explained the lack of progress on Carney’s proposed Security and Economic Agreement by blaming the difficulty of working with Canada. This seems odd on its face, but there is a Canadian reflex to bargain for the maximum benefit for the minimum price with the United States. And, as a decentralized federation in which provinces are important players, Canadian negotiators must often ensure that provincial stakeholders are willing to deliver on any commitment Ottawa negotiates. In combination, this often means talks drag on and on and result in a minimal Canadian contribution. Americans grumble that the juice you get out of the Canadians is not worth the effort of squeezing it out of them.
The 2025 US National Security Strategy reveals that this approach to Canada is putting US national security - and economic security - at unnecessary risk. Whether this is because US strategists underestimate Canada, or because the urgency behind US strategy amid growing threats makes the time-cost of securing Canadian contributions too high and so they look elsewhere for what is needed, Washington is failing to manage its relationship with Canada wisely and exposing US national interests to needless risk.
At the same time, Canada’s national security is revealed to be in jeopardy by this US National Security Strategy. The Trump administration is pursuing goals that Canada shares and could help to advance, but because Washington does not recognize this, Canada’s value as an ally is underestimated. The real-world consequences of this include Canada’s absence from the Australia United Kingdom United States (AUKUS) project, the Indo-Pacific Quad, and perhaps the USMCA if the administration chooses to replace the agreement with two separate bilateral arrangements with Canada and Mexico.
The 2025 US National Security Strategy and Canada’s near-absence within it are a sign that US-Canada relations are in trouble, but not beyond repair. The US is missing what Canada can and should do to address the challenges this strategy correctly identifies as urgent. Future US national security interests depend on Washington resolving its Canadian confusion. Future Canadian national interests depend on the ability of Ottawa to convey the alignment of US and Canadian security and economic objectives to US decisionmakers rather than relying on mere membership in alliances like NATO, NORAD, and the USMCA as evidence that Canada is important to the United States.