Continental Drift?
Where does Canada fit in the Trump administration's National Security Strategy? And where does Canada want to be?
This is a brief post on a question that has been on my mind since I read the US 2025 National Security Strategy, which I wrote about here last week.
Where does Canada fit in a world of regional blocs? And where does Canada want to be?
The administration of US President Bill Clinton followed the logic of the North Arican Free Trade Agreement and reorganized Canadian affairs within US government departments and agencies into the Western Hemisphere region. Previously, Canada had been grouped with the countries of Western Europe, mainly NATO allies.
At the time and since, many Canadian officials and friends have complained that this change places Canada among countries with which it has little in common. And with the exception of Mexico - very different from Canada but connected via NAFTA and USMCA and the supply chains these agreements have engendered - the past thirty years have not seen US relations with the countries of Latin American and the Caribbean develop in such a way that the United States gained much from having Canada grouped with the other countries of the region.
There are exceptions to this: climate change is a common concern throughout the region, and Canada’s ties with Caribbean members of the British Commonwealth and Francophonie remain particularly with Haiti. Yet climate change is a global issue, and the Caribbean is a small part of US-Canada collaborative diplomacy.
Why does it matter? In the State Department and other departments and agencies, careers tend to develop within regions. I have known many US officials whose portfolios included Canada who were by training and experience Latin Americanists - and for some, Canada was a fascinating professional challenge, while for others, Canada was the odd and puzzling country within their remit and therefore one that received less attention or perhaps less successful attention.
Geography matters, and the Trump administration has, more than any administration since Clinton’s, been open to rethinking the organization of the federal government. For example, Trump recently added Greenland to the area of responsibility of US Northern Command. And it is openly considering replacing the USMCA with two bilateral agreements, undermining further the salience of North America as a region within the Western Hemisphere.
The new National Security Strategy divides the world into just five regions: the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Canada is mentioned once in the document in a list of major economies in Asia and Europe. As I read the document, I assumed that Canada was de facto addressed within the Western Hemisphere region. But arguably, Canada belongs among the developed economies when it comes to the issues and expectations that the National Security Strategy has for other countries.
If Canadians, or leaders in Ottawa, saw a benefit to the Canadian national interest in being associated with peers in Europe, there now may be an opportunity to convince this administration to make such a change. Joining the Asia region would be harder to do, and in many ways, Australia already fills a Canada-like role in Asia so were Canada included in this region it might receive less attention as a result.
The analysis in the US 2025 National Security Strategy is not kind to Europe, and many European allies might encourage Canada to remain overlooked in the Western Hemisphere rather than face the cultural critique that the document reserves for European governments. The US strategy calls for an end to the European Union and stronger national sovereignty for its members, more border security and defense spending and security self-reliance, less regulation and red tape, greater innovation in cooperation with US technology leaders, and less immigration from outside Europe. And the document suggests that the United States will support governments, parties, and movements that support these changes - intervention in the domestic affairs of allies that would be a shocking change in traditional US policy.
But consider the admonishments of Europe in the 2025 National Security Strategy in comparison to the Trump administration’s criticism of Canada. The arguments are similar, and distinct from the agenda that the United States sets out for Latin America, including Mexico.
The US agenda for Europe also echoes Prime Minister Mark Carney’s policy agenda, which is the reason that I emphasized the alignment of Washington and Ottawa on several elements in the US Strategy. Some readers complained that I was advocating Canadian alignment as a kind of unconditional surrender to Trump demands. The point I am making is that the alignment exists already, and if that was appreciated in Washington then the Carney argument that the United States are natural competitors, not naturally in conflict over a fixed amount of jobs or investment in a zero-sum contest, could lead to greater respect for Canada from this administration.
Of course, not all Canadians support the Carney agenda. And some Canadians are too angry with the Trump administration to see any point in taking the US 2025 National Security Strategy seriously. But you do not have to agree with President Trump’s worldview to benefit from its articulation in the new Strategy. Written down in 30 pages it can be engaged with and debated in a way that tweets and off the cuff comments cannot. Better understanding how Washington sees the world is a first step toward Canada deciding how it fits - and how it wants to fit - in this vision. The US National Security Strategy may not be decisive in shaping a new world order, but to paraphrase former President Dwight Eisenhower, plans fail but planning is vital.