Do Not Divide and Be Conquered, and Never Overpay

Canadian unity strengthens Ottawa’s hand — while American pressure tactics risk winning concessions but losing trust.

For decades, U.S. policy toward separatism in Canada has rested on what diplomats came to call “the Mantra”: the United States supports “a strong and united Canada,” and Canada’s constitutional future is for Canadians alone to decide. That formula has served both countries well. As an American who cares deeply about the U.S.–Canada relationship, I believe it remains the correct official stance.

However, as someone who is not a U.S. official, but who cares deeply about the U.S.–Canada relationship, I urge Canadians who are contemplating secession not to do it — at least not now.

The Mantra emerged after the 1976 Quebec provincial election that brought a Parti Québécois (PQ) government led by René Lévesque to power, and it was repeated in the lead-up to the 1980 referendum in Québec. It remained the standard response during the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accord debates and throughout the 1995 referendum. The policy served the U.S. national interest well by signaling respect and restraint.

This year, a Quebec election that must be held by October 5, 2026, could produce another PQ government, led by Paul St-Pierre Plamondon. In 2024, Plamondon pledged to hold a third referendum if elected, and current polling suggests he could replace François Legault as premier.

Meanwhile, Alberta has seen renewed separatist momentum. The 2021 Alberta Citizen Initiative Act created a pathway for petitions with more than 400,000 signatures to trigger referenda on legislation, policy, or constitutional change. Premier Danielle Smith’s government amended the act in December 2025 to lower barriers for qualification.

The first successful petition under the amended law will lead to a referendum on October 19 regarding provincial authority over immigration. Smith has said that a question on separation could be added if independence advocates secure sufficient support.

These developments are occurring at a sensitive moment in U.S.–Canada relations.

Leverage and Its Cost

On January 23, 2026, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent remarked that an independent Alberta would be an attractive partner for the United States, citing frustrations in the province over pipeline access to global markets.

Premier Smith replied that while some Albertans favor greater autonomy or independence, they do not seek to join the United States. Still, the wording of any referendum question will depend on the citizen initiative process, and October 19 is approaching.

Secretary Bessent’s acknowledgment of separatist sentiment does not formally depart from the Mantra. But in the context of the sixth-year review of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), highlighting internal Canadian divisions inevitably increases U.S. leverage over Canada.

In the short term, maximizing leverage can produce concessions. That is the logic of hard bargaining. Yet leverage applied without regard for trust carries long-term costs. President Donald Trump’s references to Canada as a potential “51st state” have already strained goodwill across Canada’s political spectrum.

Trust is not sentimental; it is structural. In Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, Francis Fukuyama argued that successful capitalist democracies depend on shared expectations about rule-following and institutional reliability. This is especially true when economies are deeply integrated but sovereignty remains distinct.

Businesses invest when they trust exchange rates, regulatory stability, contract enforcement, and supply chains. Voters, too, evaluate foreign partners through the lens of trust.

From the 1989 implementation of the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement through the renegotiation of NAFTA that produced the USMCA, the bilateral relationship entered what now looks like a golden era. The United States negotiated rules with smaller partners — and largely abided by them. In doing so, Washington accumulated trust. Anti-Americanism in Canada declined, and public support for deeper integration increased.

The Mantra contributed to that trust. By foreswearing intervention in Canada’s internal constitutional arrangements, Washington signaled restraint. Even some Quebec separatists drew reassurance from the understanding that the United States would not intervene against their aspirations. The Mantra remains official U.S. policy, though Secretary Bessent’s comments tested its limits and, in doing so, rattled many Canadians.

Unity as Strategic Asset

As October approaches, the continued U.S. commitment to the Mantra will be tested. That it cannot be taken for granted reflects lost Canadian trust. At the same time, Ottawa and Washington are engaged in the USMCA review and other sensitive negotiations.

Divisions within Canada — particularly on questions of sovereignty — inevitably affect Canada’s negotiating posture. Even the possibility of constitutional rupture introduces uncertainty into economic and political calculations. In the language of negotiation theory, it alters perceived bargaining power and reservation values.

Canadian friends will rightly argue that the ethics of exploiting such leverage should be part of the debate in the United States and I agree. Americans should debate whether short-term gains justify long-term erosion of trust.

Yet the USMCA review is underway, and the Trump administration has shown a willingness to press maximum advantage not only against rivals but also against allies. In that environment, fragmentation strengthens the stronger party and Canada cannot wait for an American debate or future election to reverse the U.S. course.

Irrespective of the U.S. policy debate, Canadians have agency over domestic political debates and elections. While I do not dismiss the aspirations of Quebecers or Albertans who seek autonomy or independence - the Mantra remains correct: Canada’s future is for Canadians to decide - timing matters.

Major constitutional decisions taken during a period of heightened external leverage risk weakening Canada’s hand precisely when unity would strengthen it.

PQ leader Plamondon has suggested waiting until after the Trump administration before holding another referendum. That instinct reflects strategic awareness. Even so, the shadow of separation may influence negotiations over issues such as dairy supply management, energy, or regulatory cooperation.

Tradition and Prudence

G.K. Chesterton wrote that “Tradition is the democracy of the dead,” meaning that inherited practices allow the wisdom of past generations to guide present decisions. The Mantra is one such tradition, and it has served the United States well.

Another American tradition has been driving a hard bargain so as not to overpay for things. The problem with maximizing leverage in the short term is the long-term costs of this negotiating tactic arising from lost trust and goodwill.

The Roman historian Tacitus wrote in his Annals (Book II, section 26): Plura conilio quam vi perficamus (in English, we accomplish more by prudence than by force). This is the difference between tactics and strategy. The United States does not need to sow divisions among Canadians to achieve a better deal in the USMCA talks or on any other subject. By prudently forbearing the use of its leverage the United States can achieve more when Canadian trust U.S. policy and the principles that underlay it.

The true art of the deal is maximizing gain and minimizing price. The Trump administration risks doing the opposite with Canada.