Giving Offense, Getting the Best Defense?
The United States pauses the Permanent Joint Board on Defense
On Monday, May 18, 2026, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby posted on X that the United States was pausing participation in the U.S.–Canada Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) and placing the organization under review.
The move is consistent with the Trump administration’s broader approach to institutions: arrangements should continue only if they still serve a practical purpose, not simply because they exist through policy inertia. That principle is defensible. But the manner and timing of the announcement raise questions.
Colby announced the pause on social media rather than through a formal statement from Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth or President Donald Trump. He also linked the announcement to a speech by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, implying that the decision was not merely administrative, but political.
Colby wrote:
“A strong Canada that prioritizes hard power over rhetoric benefits us all. Unfortunately, Canada has failed to make credible progress on its defense commitments. DoD is pausing the Permanent Joint Board on Defense to reassess how this forum benefits shared North American defense.”
He continued:
“We can no longer avoid the gaps between rhetoric and reality. Real powers must sustain our rhetoric with shared defense and security responsibilities.”
And concluded:
“Delivering on shared continental defense begins by recognizing our shared geography. Only by investing in our own defense capabilities will Americans and Canadians be safe, secure, and prosperous.”
The linked speech was Carney’s January 2026 address at the World Economic Forum in Davos. There, Carney argued that middle powers needed to reduce their vulnerability to coercion by great powers through stronger economies and military capabilities. Some in Washington may have interpreted the remarks as a call for greater strategic autonomy from the United States.
But Carney’s argument was better understood as an acknowledgment that countries such as Canada had become overly dependent on American security guarantees while underinvesting in their own defense. His response was not defiance, but rearmament.
Indeed, the timing of the PJBD pause is strategically puzzling because Canada is finally moving in the direction Washington has long demanded. The Carney government followed through on its pledge to reach NATO’s 2 percent defense spending target and committed Canada to moving toward the alliance’s new 5 percent benchmark, including major investments in military modernization, Arctic infrastructure, and continental defense.
On the merits, Canada is becoming more aligned with U.S. defense priorities, not less. So why threaten the PJBD?
The PJBD in Historical Context
The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was established in 1940 to coordinate U.S.–Canadian continental defense planning. At the time, Canada was already at war with Germany, France had fallen, and Britain stood alone in Europe.
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt remained cautious about direct U.S. involvement in another European war, but continental defense was politically popular and strategically useful as a means of preparing the United States for possible future conflict.
Roosevelt met Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King in Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940. The two leaders agreed to coordinate continental defense planning and created the PJBD as a standing bilateral advisory body. They also aligned Canadian war production with the U.S. Lend-Lease system supporting Britain.
The significance of the agreement went beyond military planning. Canadian historian C.P. Stacey later described the creation of the PJBD as the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations characterized by “close association amounting to actual alliance.”
He was correct. The Ogdensburg Agreement marked a decisive shift from a century of mutual suspicion to institutionalized strategic cooperation.
The PJBD subsequently recommended construction of the Alaska Highway, supported the creation of the Military Cooperation Committee, and helped lay the groundwork for the establishment of NORAD in 1957. Most recently, it endorsed major NORAD modernization efforts focused on Arctic surveillance, infrastructure, and command-and-control capabilities.
The institution matters not simply because of its history, but because of the way it operationalizes cooperation.
Institutions and Operational Trust
One of the underappreciated features of the U.S.–Canada relationship is the extent to which political decisions are translated into durable operational cooperation through institutions.
The political leadership of both countries decides whether to cooperate. Institutions such as the PJBD, the Military Cooperation Committee, and NORAD then make that cooperation routine at the working level while preserving sovereign political control in Ottawa and Washington.
This structure matters because it reduces the need for constant political intervention. The relationship functions efficiently precisely because trusted institutions handle practical coordination before crises emerge.
That was the original purpose of the PJBD in 1940: to create a binational mechanism for thinking seriously about the practical defense of North America.
Today, technological change has transformed the threat environment. Hypersonic weapons, drones, cyber operations, and Arctic competition all present challenges unimaginable to Roosevelt and Mackenzie King. But after decades of alliance cooperation, Canadian and American military planners now approach these problems with highly compatible assumptions, methods, and operational cultures.
That trust did not emerge automatically. It was built through institutions such as the PJBD.
Even if the board itself were suspended indefinitely, much of its practical work could continue through the Military Cooperation Committee, NORAD, or U.S. Northern Command. In that sense, the pause may prove less operationally disruptive than its announcement suggests.
Its significance is therefore primarily political.
What the Pause Signals
First, the pause signals that at least some within the Trump administration increasingly view cooperation with Canada not as a mutually beneficial strategic arrangement, but as a privilege that Washington can withhold.
That represents a significant departure from the logic of the Ogdensburg Agreement. Roosevelt and later Eisenhower understood the strategic importance of Canadian geography for the U.S. national security and believed that cooperation with Canada materially strengthened American security. The defense of North America has always been a shared strategic enterprise grounded in mutual benefit, not unilateral concession.
Second, the episode reflects a broader erosion of institutional memory within the bilateral relationship itself.
The United States increasingly neglects or forgets the institutions that have historically made the relationship function effectively. A similar dynamic appeared during disputes over the Enbridge Line 5 modernization project, when the United States largely ignored existing bilateral mechanisms such as the International Joint Commission that were designed precisely to manage cross-border disputes.
As the two countries move into the second century of modern bilateral relations, both governments would benefit from revisiting why these institutions were created in the first place.
The PJBD exists because leaders in both countries concluded that continental defense works better when cooperation is institutionalized before a crisis occurs.
Finally, the episode also reflects the sometimes-undisciplined nature of policymaking within the Trump administration.
Had President Trump himself threatened NORAD or the PJBD directly, the announcement would carry greater strategic weight. Instead, the pause emerged through a social media post from a subordinate official. That makes the move appear less like a settled presidential decision and more like an escalation by officials seeking to signal toughness toward Canada.
The first Trump administration exhibited similar dynamics. Following the 2018 G7 summit in Charlevoix, senior administration figures issued public threats toward Canada that often exceeded President Trump’s own rhetoric. Likewise, threats to use emergency powers to block exports of medical supplies to Canada during the COVID-19 pandemic ultimately went further than the White House itself appeared prepared to sustain.
Trump’s management style centralizes consequential decisions around the president personally. That makes it entirely possible that the PJBD pause could eventually be softened or quietly reversed.
If so, Canadians will remember the episode far longer than Americans do. But there are lessons for both sides worth considering.
Canadians should see the incident as a reminder that institutionalized cooperation with the United States cannot simply be taken for granted. Institutions remain effective only when both sides remember why they exist and continue to invest political capital in sustaining them.
Americans should also recognize the value of these arrangements. Institutions such as the PJBD help keep the bilateral relationship low-maintenance, operationally efficient, and strategically resilient. Politicizing them risks creating unnecessary friction in areas where rapid coordination matters most.
That is not a theoretical concern.
On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush ordered the closure of U.S. airspace to prevent additional hijacked aircraft from reaching American targets. The order was implemented through NORAD by Canadian Lieutenant-General Mike Jellinek, who was serving as Deputy Commander at the time.
NORAD functioned as planned on one of the worst days in American history. It was planned first by the PJBD and then carried on by generations of Americans and Canadians who built the institutions, habits of cooperation, and operational trust necessary to make continental defense work. That is something worth remembering.