The Carney Doctrine?
Canada’s dealmaking with China reflects the PM’s strategy for U.S. relations
As details of several concrete agreements arising from Prime Minister Mark Carney’s visit to Beijing emerged, the initial reaction in Ottawa and Washington resembled that of an audience hearing an unfamiliar musical score performed live — attentive, uncertain, and waiting for a cue before responding. The moment of suspense was not about the substance of the agreements themselves, but about how Washington — and President Donald Trump in particular — would interpret them.
When the response came, it was unexpectedly calm. As BNN Bloomberg’s Lynn Chaya reported:
“Well, it’s OK. That’s what he should be doing,” Trump told reporters Friday at the White House. “If you can get a deal with China, you should do that.”
As Chaya also reported, United States Trade Representative Ambassador Jamieson Greer described the agreement as “problematic” because it would allow 49,000 Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs) to enter the Canadian market. This concern surfaced just weeks after the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy called on Canada and other Western allies to protect their markets from Chinese exports, in order to push China away from export-led growth and toward greater reliance on its domestic market to absorb excess manufacturing capacity.
Others will assess the merits of the agreements Carney concluded with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the Canadian economy, the Chinese economy, and Canada–China trade. The question addressed here is different: what do these developments mean for U.S.–Canada relations? And how should we interpret the apparently conflicting signals coming from Washington?
Understanding Trump
A useful clue to Trump’s expectations of other world leaders — including Carney — can be found in his remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in 2017, when he stated:
“As President of the United States, I will always put America first,” and that other leaders “will always, and should always, put your countries first.”
Canadian exports to both China and the United States have long been subject to tariffs and other restrictions. Carney’s agreements with Xi restore Chinese market access for Canadian agricultural products. From Trump’s perspective, Carney is doing precisely what a national leader should do: attempting to put Canada first.
Ambassador Greer’s concern about the opening these deals create for Chinese-made EVs reflects a position Trump articulated on January 13 at the Detroit Economic Club. There, Trump told a Motor City audience that he welcomed Chinese and other foreign automakers building plants in the United States and hiring American workers — emphasizing that domestic manufacturing is preferable to imports.
This stance echoes the approach taken by the Reagan administration toward Japanese automakers in the 1980s. It was reflected in changes to the U.S.–Canada Auto Pact embedded in the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement, which established a 50 percent North American rule of origin for tariff-free access to the U.S. market. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) raised this threshold to 62.5 percent, and the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) increased it further to 75 percent.
At the same time, both the United States and Canada maintain regulatory safety standards that any vehicle must meet before being sold in their markets.
Under the new agreement with China, Canada is permitting up to 49,000 vehicles to enter a market where nearly two million vehicles are sold annually. This is managed trade, not free trade. These vehicles will continue to face a six percent Canadian tariff and must comply fully with Canadian regulatory standards before they can be driven on Canadian roads.
Ambassador Greer is correct that this complicates the ongoing USMCA review, where the objective is greater alignment among the three partners. But North America has never operated as a formal customs union with harmonized external tariffs. Instead, internal tariff-free access has long been governed by rules of origin. Carney’s agreement with China will undoubtedly prompt discussion of automotive imports during the USMCA review — particularly as Mexico has raised tariffs on imported Chinese vehicles to 50 percent — but this added complexity is not insurmountable.
Understanding Carney
Balance has long been a defining characteristic of Canadian foreign policy. By offsetting one great power against another, Canadian prime ministers have historically sought greater freedom of action.
During the colonial period, the United States served as Canada’s counterweight to Britain — first as an alternative source of manufactured goods under British mercantilism, and later as an alternative market for Canadian primary exports after Britain repealed the Corn Laws. During the Cold War, Pierre Trudeau opened relations with Mainland China ahead of the United States and pursued a nuclear peace initiative through dialogue with the Soviet Union.
Canada’s search for equilibrium in managing its relationship with its principal partner has never been about switching sides. Rather, it reflects an effort to reduce overdependence on a single relationship and the vulnerability that dependence creates.
Carney has explored the possibility of a closer relationship with Europe. Yet European disunity, Britain’s post-Brexit position outside the European Union, and widespread insecurity stemming from Russia’s military aggression and U.S. economic pressure limit Europe’s capacity to function as a meaningful counterweight to Washington. Russia, meanwhile, is both hostile and — following its catastrophic war in Ukraine — too weakened to offer meaningful partnership, as Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela are increasingly discovering.
China therefore emerges as the only plausible alternative pole. About 4.7 percent of Canada’s population — approximately 1.71 million people — reported Chinese ethnicity in the 2021 census, giving Canada a cultural presence within the broader Sinosphere that Beijing cannot ignore.
This same logic shaped Justin Trudeau’s early approach after taking office in 2015, when he pursued improved relations with China. That effort collapsed following the Meng Wanzhou affair and Trudeau’s widely publicized and disrespectful encounter with Xi Jinping at the 2022 G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia.
Carney entered office determined to reset the tone of Canada–China relations. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea — after Trump publicly indicated he had no plans to meet with Carney, still angered by an Ontario government advertisement comparing him unfavorably to Ronald Reagan — Carney sought and obtained a meeting with Xi. The two leaders agreed to re-engage, setting in motion the visit and agreements concluded this week.
None of this occurred in secret. Carney’s Beijing trip was known in advance to the White House. Indeed, the fact that Carney succeeded in securing concrete outcomes from China may even enhance his standing in Trump’s eyes.
Chinese Takeaways
China’s outreach to Canada also occurred amid a broader diplomatic push toward U.S. partners following Trump’s renewed threats of tariffs and his willingness to act militarily without consultation with NATO allies. From Beijing’s perspective, such moments offer opportunities — not necessarily to peel allies away from Washington, but to test the resilience of U.S.-led coalitions and introduce uncertainty into allied coordination. In Canada’s case, China achieved limited success: modest commercial re-engagement without disrupting Ottawa’s fundamental strategic alignment with the United States or generating any material threat to U.S. interests.
At the same time, Carney’s Beijing visit may modestly strengthen Canada’s hand as the USMCA review approaches. Canada is frequently taken for granted in Washington as a predictable and largely compliant partner. By demonstrating initiative beyond North America — and by doing so transparently rather than covertly — Ottawa has signaled that it retains agency in shaping its external economic relationships. This challenges assumptions that Canada “doesn’t have the cards” in the tariff dispute. Carney has shown that Canada possesses some cards it can leverage — and that it can play them strategically rather than defensively.
Trump’s planned visit to China in April 2026 adds a further dimension. Carney’s ability to extract concrete concessions from Beijing may raise expectations in Washington. Trump is now likely to seek bigger and better deals for the United States than Canada’s — not only in economic substance but in political optics — reinforcing his self-conception as the ultimate dealmaker. That, however, is a problem for Beijing and not for Ottawa.
Taken together, these developments suggest the emergence of what might be described as a nascent “Carney Doctrine” in U.S.–Canada relations. During their second Oval Office meeting, Trump characterized bilateral tensions over tariffs and industrial policy as a “natural conflict.” Carney responded by reframing the relationship more structurally, arguing that Canada and the United States are “natural competitors” pursuing advantage in global markets. This formulation normalizes friction as an inherent feature of economic integration rather than a sign of diplomatic failure.
If sustained, the Carney Doctrine may subtly recalibrate bilateral expectations. For Canadians, it offers a way to interpret disagreement with Washington not as betrayal or crisis, but as an ordinary consequence of competition among closely integrated economies. For Trump, it may recast Canada less as a dependent ally and more as a capable counterpart — one that seeks to win but does so within the bounds of a durable partnership. In that sense, the Carney Doctrine does not weaken the bilateral relationship. It may instead make it more resilient by grounding it in realism rather than sentiment.